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Distributional analysis has been a widely used technique in the study of
social choice in Euclidean models [28,29,1,3,8,15,5,2,23] (see also [4] and
[19, Chaps. 11-12]) for more than two decades. In distributional analysis, a
continuum or infinite population of voters is analyzed, where the population
follows some probability distribution //.
Infinite populations do not exist. Therefore, the principal purpose of
distributional analysis must be to give insight into the behavior of large
but finite populations.
In this paper it is shown that distributional analysis is flawed when
applied to this end. The problem is essentially one of convergence: if the
limiting case is to give insight into the large finite case, behavior of the latter
should converge to behavior of the former as the population grows. Unfor-
tunately, it turns out that properties of finite populations do not in general
converge to the properties of infinite populations. In some cases a distri-
butional analysis will predict that a point is in the core with probability 1,
while the true probability converges to 0. Thus analysis of infinite popu-
lations may fail to yield any information about finite populations, however
large.
An alternative technique
An alternative probabilistic technique for the study of social choice is
termed here the finite sample method. In this method, n points are in-
dependently sampled from the distribution /z. This random finite sample
from // forms a configuration of n points whose properties are analyzed.
A typical question would be: "what is the probability, as a function of n,
that the configuration generated has nonempty core?" Typical answers to
these questions are bounds or asymptotically close estimates for the desired
probability.
It is sometimes possible to combine distributional analysis with finite
sample analysis to make correct predictions about the asymptotic behavior
of large populations. An example of this is found in [2], We expose some
key properties which enable the convergence in this case, enabling a simpler
and more general proof of the convergence of min-max majority rule. We
also estimate the population size for which the results are meaningful, i.e.,
*C
at which convergence begins to take hold. For committee sizes of 10,000
or more, a 2/3 majority rule is likely to be stable, under the concavity
assumptions of [2]. For committee sizes of 250 or less, there is some doubt
as to whether 2/3 majority rule is necessarily stable.
Following a suggestion due to Robert Foley, Richard McKelvey, and
Gideon Weiss, we explore the use of uniform convergence theorems to trans-
form distributional results into finite sample results. Theorems about the
uniform convergence of empirical measures [18, e.g.] yield a simpler and
more general proof of Simpson-Kramer min-max convergence[2] and a sim-
pler though less general proof of yolk shrinkage [26]. The analysis suggests
a rule of thumb as to when one might expect distributional analysis to give
accurate or inaccurate predictions about the behavior of finite populations.
A careful reading of Tullock's original paper [28] reveals a clear insightful
distinction between the distributional and finite sample methods, and a
remarkable foreshadowing of some of the outcomes of finite sample analysis.
Empirical study of social choice
Another motivation for analyzing the distributional method, besides the
clarification of results in the literature, is to help uncover a rigorous foun-
dation for statistical empirical study of group choice. One would like to poll
the members of a committee, assembly, or population (or in some other way
extract data on their positions on the issues), and based on that data and
some solution concept, make a prediction with some confidence regarding
what the outcome will be. How do we experimentally test a solution con-
cept? Ignoring the difficulties of data acquisition (e.g. sincerity), and any
computational issues, there is still a problem regarding the stability of the
solution concept with respect to individual perturbations. In other words,
a person's views on issues are not perfectly constant; one can even change
one's mind in the voting booth. How can we know that a prediction based
on polls taken one day is apt to be close to the actual results the next day?
We may think of each person's views as having a probability distri-
bution. When we interview a person we get a random sample from this
distribution. When that person votes or negotiates in committee, it is on
the basis of another random sample from this distribution. The problem
is to establish rigorously the stability of a solution concept under these
conditions.
In statistical terms, the finite sample from \i yields an empirical measure
fj,n . A solution concept is a statistic, a function / operating on probability
measures. If / is a consistent statistic, then the limiting behavior of /(/in)
will (almost surely) be like /(/*) and the solution concept is stable.
This issue has received a great deal of attention for the classical core
or Nash equilibrium under the term "structural stability". The outcome
is negative: the Nash solution concept is not usually applicable, and is
never structurally stable in three or more dimensions [20]. In section 6 we
illustrate how theorems for the uniform convergence of empirical measures
[18, e.g.] can be invoked to establish the stability of other more widely
applicable concepts.
The outline of the paper follows: the remainder of this section reviews
essential definitions of the spatial model. Section 2 introduces the two
methods by way of a small example. Section 3 analyzes the distributional
method. Section 4 demonstrates in greater detail a case from [l] where the
distributional method gives a misleading result. Section 5 discusses a case
(the 64%-rule of Caplin and Nalebuf [2]) where the finite sample method
may be combined with the distributional method to achieve results valid
for large finite populations. Large is argued to be somewhere between 250
and 10,000 in this case. Section 6 introduces the use of uniform conver-
gence of empirical measures and discusses in general when one may expect
the distributional method to be useful and when we may expect it to be
misleading. Section 7 concludes by re-examining Tullock's original paper
[28].
1.1 Definition of the spatial model
In the Euclidean spatial model, a social choice involving m issues is to be
made. The possible proposals are represented as vectors in 3ftm . Each in-
dividual x has a most preferred point X{ 6 3ftm . This point will be referred
to as a voter point, or simply a voter. Under Euclidean preferences, an in-
dividual faced with two alternatives will select the one closest to her most
preferred point, under the Euclidean norm. This model is more general
than it appears: Davis et al. [3] show it is equivalent to any linearly trans-
formed spatial model which maintains the properties of an inner product;
Grandmont [8] (see also [2, section 5]) observes that the essential property
of the Euclidean model is often the "division-by-hyperplane" property (in
the Euclidean case, the perpendicular bisector of two points separates those
who prefer one point to the other), and so results in the Euclidean model
usually apply to the more general class of "intermediate preferences", in-
cluding constant elasticity of substitution (C.E.S.) utility functions (these
extend the class of Davis et ai. by allowing a change to an IP norm from
the L2 norm).
2 Two methods and an example
Let us begin with a simple two-dimensional model based on an example in
[23]. Let /x be a probability distribution that is uniform on a circle (the
circumference of a disk). Place a single voter vi at the center of the circle,
which for convenience we locate at the origin. Randomly generate n — 1
additional voter points v2 , • • • , vn , where n is even, according to /i.
We introduce some terminology. A particular realization of this random
process is a configuration, a specific set of points V = {u 1 ,...,un } with
specific locations in 5Rm . In this case V is a finite configuration. If |V| is
infinite V is an infinite configuration.
the finite sample method
Next we illustrate the method of finite sample analysis on the model
just stated. The question we pose is: what is the probability that vi is
undominated in the configuration V? A result of Schofield's [23] implies
that the probability is positive, but the exact probability was not known
until recently: v is undominated with probability l/2n~ 2 . Notice that the
answer to the question is parameterized by n, as one would expect. The
proof is sketched here since it will be needed in Sections 4 and 5.
Theorem 1 Place Vi at the origin and generate V2,. ..,v„ independently
according to any nondegenerate sign-invariant distribution p. Then for all
even n, the probability Vi is undominated is l/2n
~ 2
.
Proof: ([25]) Associate for each 0, < 6 < n, a line passing through the
origin and an associated orientation. See Figure 1. Denote this line by
L{9). The open half space the line is oriented towards is the "front" and
the other open half space is the "back" of the line L{9).
Since the points are drawn from a nondegenerate distribution, the prob-
ability is that any pair of the points v2 , . .
.
,
vn are collinear with the origin.
Henceforth we assume this event does not occur.
For any < 9 < n define the gap function g(9) to equal the number
of voter points in the front half plane of L(9) minus the number of voter
points in the back of L(9). If g{9) = — 1 or 1, the line L{9) divides the n — 1
points V2»---?vn as equally as possible given that n is even. If however
the gap function g{9) ever attains \g(9)\ > 3 then one side of the line will
contain at least 1 + n/2 points and v x will not be a core point.
Starting at = 0, increase 9 continuously to 7r. Because no two points
are collinear with i>i, g{6) will change by either -f2 or -2 as the line L(8)
crosses over a point v,-. Let $i t . . . , n-i denote the values of 9 at which L(6)
crosses over a voter and let X, = +2 or — 2 accordingly as the xth crossover
increases or decreases g(9). The key observation is that the gap function
executes a random walk as 6 goes from to 7r.




rt_j are independent identically distributed variables
taking values 2 with probability 1/2 and —2 with probability 1/2.
Proof of Lemma: the proof follows easily from the sign-invariance of /z. See
Figure 2: the regions I and II are equally likely to contain the next point
as we sweep L{9) around. Details are given in [25].
There are 2n_1 possible paths for the random walk of the X, to take.
Of these, only two will keep the gap function at \g(9) < l|. These are the
alternating paths X,- = 2(— l)' and X,- = —2(— 1)\ Any nonalternating
/-"sequerree sequence must contain two consecutive +2's or two consecutive -
2's. If this ever happens, the gap function will change by 4 and so must leave
the range {— 1,1}. By Lemma 1, each of the 2n_1 possible paths occurs with
equal probability l/2n_1 . Therefore the probability that max* \g{9)\ < 1 is
2/2n_1 = l/2n
" 2
as desired. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
A few remarks about Theorem 1: the proof only assumes (i is sign-
invariant: //(y) = n{—y), so it applies to the uniform rectangle distribution
in [29,1] and many others. For the model under discussion, Theorem 1
gives a stronger outcome, for obviously (w.p.l) no other point in 9R 2 can
be undominated. Thus the configuration V has nonempty core with exact
probability l/2n" 2 .
the distributional method
Now let us illustrate the distributional method on the same model. (The
following closely follows analyses in [29,23,3,8]). Assume a continuum of
voters uniformly distributed on the circle. Every line passing through has
mass < 1/2 on either side of it. That is, each halfspace h defined by a line
through has fx(h) < 1/2. Thus v is undominated. In fact by [3, theorem
l] or [15, theorem 2] it is the unique "dominant" or undominated point.
(The reader who is concerned about the "extra" point at may observe
that this only improves the position of with respect to equilibrium.)
The contrast between the two methods is evident. The finite sample
method shows that the probability of being undominated, indeed of a
nonempty core, rapidly converges to 0. The distributional method says
that for an infinite population, the probability of being undominated is
1.
The example of this section reveals that there is a flaw in the distribu-
tional method. It would be desirable for the outcome of the distributional
method to coincide with the limiting behavior of finite samples, since the
goal must be insight into the behavior of finite populations. Yet there
could hardly be less consonance than in the example just given. In the
next section we analyze the distributional method to explain how this flaw
arises.
3 An analysis of the distributional method
A contrast with distributional analysis
We have observed that the outcomes of the two methods can differ.
Let us point up an important distinction in how they operate. The dis-
tributional method works directly with (X, and quantities such as ix{h) are
considered. On the other hand, in the finite sample method a configura-
tion V is drawn from /z, and quantities such as \V D h\ are considered.
Informally, the distributional method counts up voters by looking at the
distribution function \x directly, while the finite sample method counts up
voters by looking at configurations drawn from it.
More formally, the distribution function \i analyzed in finite sample
analysis is not an infinite configuration, rather it is a probability measure
defined on the appropriate CI, which for fixed n may be thought of as the set
of all possible configurations of cardinality n. In contrast the distributional
method treats /x as an infinite configuration.
A brief history of distributional analysis
BTHheJirerature, ihe term distribution is used in the economics litera-
ture to mean both "configuration" and "distribution function" as defined
here. If we examine the literature of distributional analyses, we find that
it is intertwined with analyses giving necessary and/or sufficient conditions
for domination, local equilibrium, and/or global equilibrium in finite con-
figurations (to use terminology defined here) [17,15,3,1,23,16]. For instance,
Plott's classic paper [17] is titled
A notion of equilibrium and its possibility [emphasis added] un-
der majority rule.
Plott performs no probabilistic analysis but observes (quite rightly) [IBID,
page 792] that
it would only be an accident (and a highly improbable one) if
an equilibrium exists at all.
Tullock's analysis [28] is, as Davis et al. [3, page 148] observe, "informally
developed without theorems or proofs by the device of insightful examples."
Later papers such as [15,3,16] meld these analyses by formalizing ideas of
Tullock [28,29] and simultaneously generalizing Plott's results to infinite
populations and/or more general preference functions (also global rather
than local equilibrium). For instance, Davis et al. [3, page 148] contrast
their work with Plott's since the latter
allows only a finite number of individuals to be considered.
Presumably Davis et al. view this "limitation" of Plott's analysis as un-
desirable because more insight is needed as to the behavior of large finite
populations.
In 1981 however Tullock remarks [30, page 190] that his analysis was
"not regarded as very reliable any more because McKelvey proved that ma-
jority voting can reach any part of the issue space." The analysis Tullock
refers to ultimately showed (see [22,23,20, e.g.]) that the set of configu-
rations for which equilibrium exists is measure 0, for d > 3 and also for
d = 2 and odd n, confirming what Plott had said all along. These pow-
erful results seem implicitly to invalidate the distributional analyses. Yet,
this consequence does not even now appear to be fully assimilated in the
literature. The only unresolved case was d = 2,n even, (and that was my
original motive for undertaking this line of research.)
Where is the flaw in distributional analysis?
We have seen that some of the distributional analyses suggested im-
plications at odds with the instability theorems of McKelvey, Schofield,
Rubenstein, and others[l2, 13,21,20], So is there a flaw in the distributional
arguments, and if so what is it? The crucial part is lucidly exposed by
Arrow in his 1969 paper [l]. Summarizing Tullock's analysis, Arrow writes
[page 108):
He [Tullock] assumes
(l) that the number of voters is large, so large that we may
consider them to constitute a continuum.
This assumption seems innocuous enough. In the mathematics literature,
passing to the limiting continuous case is a popular technique. The problem
is that majority rule requires us to evaluate n/2 where n = the number
of voters, but the value oo/2 is not well-defined. More precisely, if is
undominated and only one voter is located at then placing two additional
voters together at any location x ^ must make dominated (by the point
ex for sufficiently small e > 0. But if n is treated as infinite no shifting of
any finite number of voters changes the analysis, since oo/2 + 1 = oo/2.
What happens is that a new definition is needed when passing from the
finite to the infinite case. Let us examine a specific definition from the
literature. In an article by Davis, DeGroot, and Hinich [3], necessary and
sufficient conditions are derived for the existence of a dominant point. As
stated earlier, this analysis, unlike Plott's, is intended to apply to infinite
populations. The critical definition of a non-dominance relation R is quoted
below [3, page 149].
Let P* denote the distribution of most preferred points of the
individuals. Let X be the most preferred point of an individual
chosen at random from the population, [note P* is referred to
as an infinite configuration in the previous sentence and as a
probability function in the next sentence] Given a (Borel) set
S C En , Pr(S) will denote the probability that X G S under
the distribution P*.
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Definition 1: For any points y G En and z £ En , it is said
that yRz if Pr(||y - X\\ < \\z - X\\) > §.
The definition of the relation R just given is mathematically unambigu-
ous and therefore is mathematically correct. The mathematics in the paper
[3] is of course correct. But there is a problem with the interpretation of
the mathematical results. In [3] the passage just cited continues with the
following interpretation:
In other words, yRz if and only if at least half the population
either prefers y to z or is indifferent between y and z.
What does the word "population" mean in the sentence just quoted? If
we take it to mean the probability measure, then it would be accurate to
say that
yRz if and only the measure (mass) of the subset of the popu-
lation, that either prefers y to z or is indifferent between y and
2, is at least 1/2.
But if the word "population" refers to a finite sample drawn from the
distribution P' , then the meaning of yRz is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Suppose a finite number of points are drawn at random
according to the distribution P* . Then
yRz if and only if the probability is at least 1/2 that at least
half the population either prefers y to z or is indifferent between
y and z.
Proof: Suppose yRz. If we were to take a finite sample under the distri-
bution P*, each sample point would with probability at least 1/2 be at
least as close to y as to z. Then the number of points in the sample at
least as close to y as to z follows a binomial distribution with "success"
parameter p > 1/2. From the most elementary properties of the binomial
distribution p > 1/2 implies the probability is at least 1/2 that at least half
the outcomes are "successes". Conversely, if the probability is at least 1/2
that at least half of the Bernoulli trials end in success, it must be that the
parameter p > 1/2, whence yRz.
3.1 The heart of the problem
We have arrived at the heart of the problem. When going from finite
to infinite populations, a new definition of the nondominance relation R
was needed. Succinctly, let A denote "at least half the population either
prefers y to z or is indifferent between y and z." Then for any finite
sample population, yRz means that A occurs with probability 1/2. But the
interpretation for infinite populations in [3] is, yRz means that A occurs.
If the purpose of the mathematical analysis of infinite populations in [3]
is to gain insight into the behavior of large finite populations, then there
should be a closer correspondence between the meanings of yRz for finite
samples and for infinite populations.
The gap between the finite sample (Theorem 2) and the distributional
(Definition 1) methods just discussed is between 1/2 and 1. In the earlier
example of section 2 involving Theorem 1, the gap was (asymptotically)
between and 1. The larger gap in that example was due to the intersection
of many events each with probability 1/2.
4 An unsuccessful case: The Sonnenschein-
Arrow Theorem
Let us now examine a specific case of analysis from the literature where
the predictions of distributional analysis are misleading. In his article,
Arrow continues by stating a theorem (he attributes to Sonnenschein) that
generalizes Tullock's example [l, pages 108-109]:
For any pair of alternatives x,y, let N{x,y) be the number
of individuals who prefer x to y. Then let xMy be the state-
ment N(x,y) > N(y,x) and xMy the statement that N(x,y) >
N(y,x)....
Theorem. Suppose that, for each alternative x°, the set of
alternatives x for which xMx° is closed, and [suppose] the set
of alternatives [xj for which xMx° is convex. Then for any
compact (closed and bounded) convex set of alternatives S, there
is (at least) one alternative x in S such that xMy for all y in
S.
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Arrow later points out that "the hypotheses of the theorem are obvi-
ously fulfilled in Tullock's example." [IBID, page 110]. This is of course
correct, but only subject to assumption (l) above. For if we employ the fi-
nite sample method of this paper, we find the probability converges to that
the hypotheses of the Sonnenschein-Arrow theorem are fulfilled in Tullock's
example. The following theorem states and proves this statement precisely.
Theorem 3. Under the hypotheses of Tullock's example or of Theorem 1,
the probability that the set \x : xMOl is convex converges to as n — oo.
Proof: It suffices to consider only the more generous assumption of
Theorem 1. Recall the gap function g{6) used in the proof of Theorem
1. If (and only if) g(9) > 1 then a strict majority of the points are in
the halfplane defined by the normal vector ve with orientation 8. Then for
sufficiently small e > 0, the point y = ev 9 dominates 0, i.e. y is in the
set [x : xMO]. Rotate the vector v through an open halfplane, i.e. let 6
range in the interval [0, w). If the gap function g{9) ever exceeds 1, drops
to 1 (or below), and later exceeds 1 again, the set [x : xMO] will fail to
be convex (see Figure 3). This is because there will exist distinct values
< 8i < 9 2 < #3 < 7r such that for all sufficiently small € > 0, (t,#i) and
(e,03 ) are in the set, but (^,#2) is n°t in the set (using (r, 6) notation). If
the random walk executed by the gap function behaves in this fashion, then
the set is not convex, and we call the walk "bad".
By Lemma 1, the values of the gap function execute an unbiased random
walk centered around 0. Therefore we may select the orientation of 6 = so
that the walk has n — 2 steps and starts at 1. By the recurrence properties
of one dimensional symmetric random walks [6, e.g.], the walk is bad with
probability 1 as n — 00. In fact it will be bad infinitely often, so the set
[x : xMO] will have many nonconvexities. This proves the theorem.
It has previously been observed that the Sonnenschein-Arrow Theorem
can fail to be applicable. Greenberg [9], in a lovely paper on d-majority
equilibrium, gives a deterministic example with n = 4 voters in which
the set \x : xMO] is not convex. At the time it must have seemed that
examples such Greenberg's would become less likely as n increased. For
instance Kramer [11, page 313] remarks,
Several authors, . . . have argued that this instability is a "small-
sample" problem, and that majority equilibria will be more
11
likely when the number of voters is large; examples and results
supporting this thesis have been exhibited by
Theorem 3 demonstrates that Greenberg's example represents the rule,
not the exception.
5 A successful case: The 64%-rule
Although the distributional method can mislead, it sometimes gives per-
fectly accurate predictions of the asymptotic behavior of finite populations.
An excellent example is found in a recent paper by Caplin and Nalebuf [2].
They consider a class of voting procedures, parameterized by < 6 < 1, in
which the status quo or incumbent can only be defeated or dislodged if more
than 6 of the population supports the contesting alternative. Caplin and
Nalebuf first employ the distributional method: they show that if the distri-
bution function /x is concave, then the smallest 6 that guarantees an equilib-
rium (undefeatable) point, called the Simpson-Cramer min-max majority, is
1 — {m/{m + l))m
.([2, Theorem 2]). They continue and prove ([2, Theorem
3], essentially the same result is apparently found in [5, 2.4(iii),pp. 151-152,
5.3 p. 164]) that if a finite sample of size n is drawn at random from the con-
cave distribution iz, then the min-max majority of the sample converges to
the min-max majority of /z a.e.. Hence, "the bounds of the paper extend to
large finite populations drawn from a concave density" [2, page 801]. Thus
the distributional method is a success in this case.
One must take some care in applying the bounds to the finite case.
Consider a uniform population density on an equilateral triangle (see Figure
4). The mass of /x in the shaded region is 5/9; it follows that the chances
are close to 50% that more than 5/9 of a random sample will fall in the
shaded region. But if this occurs, the center will not be a 5/9-majority core
point, however slightly the sample fraction exceeds 5/9.
In fact a stronger statement is true: the triangle center is a 5/9-majority
rule point with (asymptotic) probability no more than 1/8.
Theorem 4. Let n ideal points be generated independently from the uni-
form distribution on a regular triangle. Let pn denote the probability that
the triangle center is a 5/9 majority point. Then limsupn {pn } < 1/8.
Proof: see appendix.
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Theorem 4 does not negate Theorem 2 of [2] in a substantial way. To
begin with, there is the possibility that some other point very close to the
triangle center is undefeated. But more importantly, suppose that for any
e > 0, a (5/9 + £)-majority rule were employed. Then, by the almost sure
convergence of Theorem 3 of [2], the probability converges to 1 that the
triangle center is a majority point.
One of the beautiful things about Theorem 2 of [2] is the dimension-free
corollary that 1 — 1/e-majority rule will have a core, (which leads to the
title of the paper). Since for any fixed dimension m, there exists an e >
such that 1 — (m/(ra + l))m + £ < 1 — 1/e, the analog of Theorem 4 is
false for the dimension-free corollary. That is, an immediate and very nice
consequence of Theorem 3 of [2] and its corollary is the following:
Corollary: Let n points be sampled independently from any concave dis-
tribution on 5Rm . Then the probability converges to 1, as n — oo, that the
centroid of the distribution is a 1 — 1/e-majority rule point.
How rapid is the convergence? In the case of a sign-invariant distribu-
tion in two dimensions, proposition 1 below states we can certainly expect
an error of order l/y/n.
Proposition 1. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, the largest majority
that can be mustered against the origin has expected value > \n+v n > .
Proof: From the proof of Theorem 1, the gap function executes a random
walk around 0. The expected absolute distance from at the end of a
random walk is y/n/2 [6], Dividing by the population size n gives the
result.
I have not been able to determine rigorous lower bounds in general. If
the region is triangular instead of circular, the random walk is not sta-
tionary (in fact it is no longer Markovian), but heuristically we can again
expect the maximum gap to be on the order of y/n in expected value from
the largest distributional gap. The convergence theorems cited in the next
section will tell us that the error levels can be expected not to exceed
0(l/y^).
With a committee size of 100 (e.g. U.S. Senate), l/y/n is a fairly sub-
stantial 10%. If we seek an explanation for the stability of 2/3-majority rule
in a group of this size, therefore, concavity is not quite enough. Concavity
13
together with a limitation to 2 issues (m = 2 dimensions) might suffice. Al-
ternatively, the extreme cases of triangular or simplicial distributions may
in reality be quite rare.
If the population size is 10,000 or more, drawn from a concave density,
the probability of stability under majority rule appears to be fairly good.
From Proposition 1 we heuristically may expect that the maximum gap
will usually not exceed several multiples of the expected value y/n/2, say
6(y/n/2) = Zy/n. At n = 10,000 this gap as a fraction of population is
3 \/l0000/ 10000 « 3%. But however high the policy space dimension m,
there is always a "cushion" of about 3% between 2/3 and 1 — 1/e. On the
oher hand, When the population size is n = 250 or less, equilibrium may be
unlikely. Tnis is because Proposition 1 suggests that a gap of at least y/n/2
will occur quite often. We then have V250/2(250) « 3%, so the cushion is
not big enough unless additional restrictions are placed on the preferences
of the voter population.
Thus the min-max majority results of [2], particularly the dimension-
free bounds, provide a successful application of distributional analysis to
large finite populations, though some care must be taken in applying the
results to smaller committee sizes.
6 General clues
Why do the distributional results discussed in section 5 apply to large finite
populations, while those discussed previously do not? Part of the answer
has to do with the difference between non-dominance and strict dominance.
Recall from section 4 that the finite sample meaning of the non-dominance
relation R does not converge to the meaning in the distributional case.
In contrast, the strict dominance relation P : yPz iff yRz and not yRz
does converge. That is, if yPz in the distributional sense, and a random
sample of n points is taken, then yPz with respect to that finite sample
with probability converging to 1 as n — oo. (This follows immediately from
the weak law of large numbers and Davis tt a/.'s observation that uyPz if
and only if Pr(||y - X\\ < \\z - X\\) > 1/2.")
This difference is not enough. For example, suppose distribution /i
is uniform in a square centered at y. Then for all z ^ y, yPz in the
distributional sense. But if a finite sample of size 2n is taken, then by
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Theorem 1 with probability converging to 1 there will exist z ^ y such that
zPy. However, suppose y strictly dominated all z in some compact set
Z. We might then argue, if fi were continuous, that the strict domination
occured with a minimum gap of some 6 > 0. If we could then find a way
to reduce consideration Z to a finite, relatively small (e.g. polynomial in
n) number of points, we could establish the desired behavior of the finite
sample. These ideas are found in the proof of Theorem 3 in [2], where £c/M*c'/&f a*f
Lemma 1 (page 807) provide^ the reduction to a finite number (n + 1)
of points. Similar ideas are found in [26], where the fundamental basis
extreme point theorem of linear programming provides the reduction to a
finite number.
The preceding suggests that the mathematical tools for the convergence
of empirical measures may be appropriate to these questions 1 . This turns
out to be the case. The interested reader should consult chapter 2, "Uni-
form Convergence of Empirical Measures" of Pollard's excellent book[l8].
A couple of the most pertinent results are cited below (specialized to our
case and adapted to our terminology):
Definition. Let n points be drawn at random according to a probability
measure /z. on 9?m . The empirical measure fxn is that which places mass l/n
at each of the n points (obviously they need not be distinct.)
Let C denote a class of sets in 9?m . For any c G C, it follows that /zn (c)
simply equals the fraction of the points which fell in c. The class C of most




lp . x < p0] ;p e gr, p
°
€ 3?} . (1)
Also let C + = [£], the set of open halfspaces, and let V = C U C + . The
uniform convergence theorem of [18] implies that the empirical measure
converges to /x over these classes.
Theorem 5. Let /z be a probability measure on 3?m . Then
sup \fjLn (d) - n(d)\ -> almost surely (2)
dev
Proof: this follows from Theorem 14 (page 18), Lemma 15(i,ii)(page
18), and Lemma 18 (pages 20-21) of [18].
X
I am indebted to Bob Foley, Richard McKelvey, and Gideon Weiss for suggesting this
line of attack
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This means that even if we consider all half-spaces h, the largest gap
between the fraction of points falling in the half-space, and the expected
fraction (iu,(h)), converges to 0.
To demonstrate the usefulness of Theorem 5, we invoke it to prove the
convergence of the min-max majority. The first part of Theorem 6 gener-
alizes Theorem 3 of [2] from bounded continous to arbitrary distributions,
the second part of Theorem 6 is very similar to 2.4 (iii) and Proposition
10 in [5]. Yet the proof of Theorem 6 is much shorter and simpler. This
confirms the appropriateness of this line of attack (and the wisdom of my
colleagues).
Theorem 6 Let ^ be a probability measure on 9ftm . Let n points be ran-
domly independently sampled from fx. Then the min-max majority value of
the sample, o.{^n ) converges to the distributional min-max majority q(m)
almost surely. If in addition \i is continuous and possesses unique min-max
winner point 2, then the min-max winner of the sample converges a.s. to
z.
Proof: If 2 is an a-majority point with respect to /x then by Theorem 5 it
will be an a + e-majority point for \in eventually, for any positive e. Thus
limsup{a(//n)} < a(/z). Conversely, for any < a(/z), set <5 = a(n)— 0. For
all x £ 9?m , there exists a hyperplane h x through x such that a halfspace h+
defined by hx has mass ^{h^) < + 5. Again by Theorem 5, the supremum
of the fractional discrepancies over all these halfspaces converges to a.s.
Thus,
mf\nn {kt)\> + 6/2 (3)
eventually, with probability 1 (a fraction of at least + 6/2 can be mustered
against every point.) Hence liminfn {a(//n)} > a(/i). This proves the first
part of Theorem 6.
The proof of the first part has moreover established that z has limiting
minimal winning supermajority fraction a. It remains to show that no
points other than z can also be winning with fraction a. Accordingly let
£ > be arbitrary. Let 5 C 5Rm be an enormous ball containing z and with
fi(S) > ex, so that eventually with probability 1 no point outside 5 can
be an a-majority winner. Let T denote 5 with the small ball of radius €
around z removed, T = S\B(z,e). By the compactness of T and continuity
of /x, there exists such that the minmax majority over all x 6 T equals
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(3. By the uniqueness of z, > a. Then by the same argument as led to
inequality 3, eventually with probability 1 we have:
inf **(/£) > p -6/2 > a
Hence eventually no point in T will be an a-majority winner. This com-
pletes the proof.
Theorem 6 ensures convergence of a(/xn ) holds for any distribution.
This is of particular importance for empirical applications, because spatial
voting data is often discrete. For example, the Senate data in [10] and other
studies [24] are taken from roll call votes. Similarly, most public opinion
polls ask yes/no questions or limit answers to integers in a small range
(e.g. 1-5). In all these cases the real data will be discrete. Even if kernel
smoothing ([18, pp. 35,42]) were employed the resulting distributions might
not be continuous. Also notice the following: if two groups of samples were
taken from //, Theorem 5 would ensure the convergence of the two empirical
measures to each other. This matches the scenario described in section 1,
where information from polls or past voting records is used to predict an
outcome.
In general, we consider a function(al) / whose domain is the set of
probability measures and whose range is the reals. For example, / might
be an indicator function for the event "0 is undominated", or /,• might be
the ith coordinate of the center of mass of the distribution. When / is
continuous, the uniform convergence of the empirical measure will ensure
the convergence of /(/in ) to /(m)-
Consider the indicator function just defined. It is not continuous, in
the following sense: there exists e > such that for all A > 0, there exist
empirical distributions \xn and Jin satifying
sup \fin (d) - ftn (d)\ < A
but \f(nn) — /(An) | > e- (Just take e = .9). Moreover the discontinuity
occurs just at the distributions of interest, where the fraction on one side of
a hyperplane is 1/2. From a more general point of view, this explains the
failure of finite behavior to converge to distributional behavior as discussed
in sections 3 and 4.
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The mathematical guideline for convergence is the continuity of the
functional. Let us attempt to formulate a less technical rule of thumb to
give a general sense of how to make accurate predictions for finite popu-
lations based on distributional results: if the event or quantity of interest
depends on the precise way voters are split among regions, then a conver-
gence problem is apt to arise; if it relies instead on having a certain fraction
or more in a region, then the result is apt to apply to the large finite case,
possibly with the fraction perturbed slightly.
Let us apply these observations to the yolk radius convergence shown in
[26] . A hyperplane is median if the two closed halfspaces it defines each con-
tains at least half the population. The yolk is the smallest ball intersecting
all median hyperplanes [7,14]. If there is a simple majority rule core point
the yolk is that point. Under what circumstances can we expect the yolk
radius to be small? From a distributional point of view 2 , a yolk radius of
corresponds to a nonempty core. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a
nonempty core, in the distributional sense, are (see [3,15]) that /x be weakly
centered: every hyperplane through is a median hyperplane. Therefore a
distributional analysis predicts that weak centeredness would be necessary
and sufficient for the yolk radius of random samples to converge to 0.
Our rule of thumb suggests that there may be a problem with the exact
50:50 split of the weak centeredness condition, but that a (50 + e) : (50 —
e) splitting condition would be apt to work. It turns out that the true
necessary and sufficient condition is that fj. be strictly centered[26]: for every
hyperplane not passing through 0, the halfspace it defines not containing
the origin must contain strictly less than half the population. This outcome
seems well in accord with the guidelines proposed above.
We can invoke Theorem 5 to prove the sufficiency half of this result3
,
though under an additional assumption of continuity of the distribution /z.
Despite the lessened generality of Theorem 7, the ease and brevity of its
proof are noteworthy. Theorem 7. Let n points be sampled independently
from /z, a strictly centered continuous distribution on 9Jm . Then the radius
of the yolk of the sample converges to a.s. as n — oo.
Proof: see Appendix.
2 this distributional analysis is due to Richard McKelvey
3 the essentials of this proof were suggested to me independently by Robert Foley,
Richard McKelvey, Loren Platzman, and Gideon Weiss.
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7 Rereading Tullock's paper on the general
irrelevance...
The results in this paper might seem to invalidate claims in Tullock's orig-
inal work. A careful reading shows this is not so. Tullock's original paper,
"The general irrelevance of the general impossibility theorem" [28], is in my
opinion an altogether brilliant piece of work, combining important empiri-
cal evidence (the scarcity of actual cycling or chaos) with abundant creative
inspiration and exceptional mathematical intuition (as well as dramatic ex-
position). A careful reading reveals that Tullock is actually discussing finite
configurations, and only appeals to the infinite configurations as an intu-
itive aid. For example, after describing a uniform distributional model,
Tullock writes ([28, page 259]):
This might be called the perfect geometrical model, in which
the number of voters whose optima fall in a given area is ex-
actly proportional to its area. Given that the voters are finite
in number, small discontinuities would appear. Two areas that
differ little in size might have the same number of voters; in-
deed, the smaller might even have more. Cycles are, therefore,
possible, but they would become less and less important as the
number of choosing individuals increases.
Later, Tullock specifically remarks that the probability of cycling should
increase as the population grows [IBID, page 261]:
For close to the center, the area which is preferred to A
would be farther from the center than A. Cycling becomes
more probable. When we get very close to the center a point
randomly selected from among those which could get a majority
over the given point would have a good chance of being farther
from the center than it is. At this point, however, most voters
will feel that new proposals are splitting hairs, and the motion
to adjourn will carry.
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This intuitive statement is in accord with Theorem 1. Thus Tullock is not
claiming that cycles won't usually exist in large populations 4 . Tullock's
main point is that they won't matter.
One of the arguments Tullock advances to support his point is that
unless proposals were carefully manipulated, "the voting process would in
all probability lead to rapid movement toward the center [28, page26l].
This argument is actually a loose forerunner of the yolk, the smallest ball
intersecting all median hyperplanes. (Tullock's discussion of intersections
of median lines, pages 261-262, is especially evocative of the yolk.)
Since that time the yolk has been rigorously established by Ferejohn,
McKelvey, and Packel [7] and McKelvey [14]. More recently it has been
proved that the radius of the yolk does converge to a.s. for the distribution
of Tullock's example (or any other centered distribution) [26]. Considering
the length of time by which Tullock's work preceded the mathematical
development of the appropriate technical tools, Tullock's insights seem all
the more remarkable.
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9 Appendix: Proof of Theorems 4 and 7
Proof of Theorem 4: The three lines through the triangle center in Figure 5
divide the triangle into the six regions labelled a, b, c, d, e, /. For notational
ease, let the region label also represent the number of sample points falling
in that region. If the center is to be a 5/9-majority point, then b + c + d <
5/9, and similarly d + e + f < 5/9; / + a + b < 5/9. These imply our key
inequalities: 6 - e < 1/9; c- f < 1/9; d - a < 1/9. That is,
He also argues that "it is possible, by simple majority voting, to reach points at almost
any portion of the issue space", an adumbration of the classic chaos theorems of McKelvey
and Schofield [12,13,21,22]
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the number of points in each rhombus is no more than n/9 more than
the number of points in the opposing triangle. Applying the strong law of
large numbers, the actual number in each region, for large n, will be within
0(y/n) of its expected value with very high probability (geometrically de-
creasing chance of failure). We may therefore condition on the partitioning
among the three rhombus-triangle pairs being close to the expected value
of n/3 in each of these three paired regions, and the error in our result-
ing estimate converges to 0. Once we condition on this likely event, the
three key inequalities become independent. Now approximating the bino-
mial distribution of parameters ~ n/3, 1/3 with a normal distribution, (by
the strong law of large numbers), and since n 1 ' 2 dominates n 1 /4
,
it follows
that the probability is asymptotically 1/2 that the gap between rhombus
and opposing triangle of the three inequalities. (In other words the median
and mean of the binomial are very close). Therefore, the conditional prob-
ability that that three key inequalities all hold is asymptotically 1/8. Thus
pn in the limit is bounded by 1/8. This proves Theorem 4.
The upper bound of 1/8 in Theorem 4 can be extended easily to l/2m+1
for m dimensions.
I would moreover conjecture that pn —* as n — oo.
Theorem 7 5 Let n points be sampled independently from /j., a strictly
centered continuous distribution on 3ftm . Then the radius of the yolk of the
sample converges to a.s. as n —* oo.
Proof: Following the proof in [26], we show that the largest distance
from to any median hyperplane converges to 0. Since this distance is an
upper bound on the yolk radius, the result will follow.
For any i^ 0, let h+ denote the halfspace not containing the origin
denned by the hyperplane normal at x. By strict centeredness ii(h+ ) < 1/2.
By continuity ^(h*) is continuous in x.
Let
€ > be arbitrary. Clearly the largest vote attained against
by points e or more away from is attained by points c away, or more
accurately
sup n(k+) = sup p[h£).
IMI>« ll*ll=«
By compactness of the set the latter supremum is taken over, and continuity,
'see the acknowledgment footnote, page 18.
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the supremum is attained. Thus there exists /3 < 1/2 such that for all
||x|| > e, we have Ai(/i+) < /?.
The halfspaces h* are contained in the class C. Let the n points be
sampled from p. Apply Theorem 5 to find that with probability 1, as n
increases,
Pn(K) <^^ < 1/2V||X|| > 6.
This implies that there is no median hyperplane at distance e or more
from 0, whence the result follows.
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